A New Vision of Science :: Science Scientific Papers

A New Vision of Science ABSTRACT: Traditional convictions regarding science (such as universalism, necessity and eternal validity) are currently in doubt. Relativism seems to destroy scientific claims to rationality. This paper shows a way to keep the traditional convictions of scientific knowledge while acknowledging relativism. With reference to the practicing scientist, we replace descriptivism with constructivism; we modify relative validity with the claim to understanding; and, we offer methodological strategies for acquiring understanding. These strategies we call strangification, which means taking a scientific proposition system out of its context and putting it in another context. We can thus see the implicit presuppositions of the given proposition system by means of the problems arising out of the application of this procedure. Such a change in the understanding of science holds important consequences. There is a personal background for the new understanding of science I am proposing in this article. These ideas that are now comprised within the notion Constructive Realism have been developed over the last twenty years during interactions and in cooperatio with other scientists. Now I am giving them my voice for a couple of short arguments why this new understanding isneeded today. It should be mentioned that the dialogue with my former friends from the Vienna Circle hs, to some extent, been important in this process. The Vienna Circle was so complex and encompassed so many different ideas that some traces of what I am argueing can be found there. Presently, however, my own understanding of sciencehas departed crucially from what is usually considered as the Vienna Circle's stance toward science. Without being aware of it, the Vienna Circle was the last great attempt for a rational metaphysics of science. It was trying to establish a correspondence of purified human mind with the w orld. Probably, this is why they argued so sharply against traditional, i.e. irrational metaphysics. Contrary to the declared position of most of the Vienna Circle's members, however, Constructive Realism does not struggle against metaphysics. I appreciated very much the example of Erwin Schrà ¶dinger because it has wonderfully shown in which degree a scientist is influenced by his metaphysical background. Checking the bckgound of scientific doing one is getting a lot of impressions about metaphysical world.comcepts, metaphysical concepts of knowledge etc. If we lay aside our apprehension to touch metaphysics, science can even bepushed forward by it. In fact we should have many metaphysics. They are offereing unusual perspectives and this is exactly what science needs to progress.